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ISSUE DEFINITION 
The construction of a 3,000 mile-long pipeline to bring natural gas from 
the Urengoi field in Siberia to the West European natural gas network is a 
critical element of Soviet energy plans for the 1980s. (Figure 1 shows the 
existing pipeline network of the Soviet Union and the export and domestic 
pipelines the Soviets plan to construct by 1985.) Through the pipeline, which 
is planned to be operational by 1984, the Soviets plan to export an 
additional 40 billion cubic meters (BCK) of natural gas annually to Western 
Europe, tripling the current export level. Pipe and equipment from West 
Europe and Japan, and credit from Western banks are essential if the pipeline 
is to be completed on time. The Reagan Administration and the West European 
governments are sharply divided on the desirability of the pipeline. The 
Administration and some Members of Congress argue that the pipeline would 
make West European participants overly dependent on Soviet natural gas and 
equipment orders and, thus, vulnerable to Soviet threats to cut off the gas 
in a political crisis. They also argue that the USSR would obtain much 
needed convertible currency from the gas sales. The West Europeans respond 
that vulnerability to the Soviet "gas leverpp can be avoided by the creation 
of a "safety net" of alternative supplies of non-Soviet gas and other fuels. 
Although some West European political parties are hesitant, most Europeans 
believe that participation is essential to their plans for reducing their 
dependence on OPEC oil and for diversifying supplies of natural gas. In 
addition, they note that equipment orders for the export pipeline and the 
other pipelines that the Soviets plan to bring gas to the central regions of 
the Soviet Union, which may total $10 - 15 billion in the first half of. the 
decade, could spell the difference between prosperity and recession for key 
industrial sectors. 
In the U.S. policy debate two schools have emerged. One would make every 
effort to halt or delay the pipeline by direct or indirect methods, while the 
other would treat the pipeline as a fait accompli and focus on measures to 
reduce West European vulnerability to the "gas lever." The differences 
between the schools of thought were heightened first in December 1982 wehn 
President Reagan banned U.S. sales of energy related equipment and technology 
to the U.S.S.R. and then in June 1982 when these sanctions were expanded to 
include U.S. affiliates and foreign companies with U.S. contractual 
relations. This broadened coverage has added the issues of retroactivity, 
extraterritoriality, and contract sanctity to the portfolio of the fait 
accompli school. Congressional action was unsuccessful in overturning the 
Administration's action (th Findley-Bonkers - H.R. 6838) in September. The 
Broomfield amendment tied the removal of the sanctions to Administration 
assurance that "forced laborw is not being or would not be used in the 
construction of the export pipeline. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
U.S. PERSPECTIVES 
The Reagan Administration has made concerted efforts to dissuade the West 
European countries, especially West Germany, the key participant, from going 
ahead with the proposed pipeline from the U.S.S.R. to West Europe. The 
President raised the issue at the head-of-state level on several occasions -- 
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in April 1981 and January 1982 with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 
Washington and in July 1981 with French President Mitterrand as well as the 
Chancellor at the Economic Summit at Ottawa. The Administration's chief 
argument was that the additional gas deliveries would make major NATO allies 
dependent on Soviet gas, and, hence, vulnerable to Soviet threats to cut off 
the gas during a political crisis. The Administration also argued against 
the pipeline on the grounds that it would provide the Soviets with large 
amounts of hard currency -- perhaps as much as $11.1 billion annually by the 
mid-1980s, according to an estimate by the Defense Intelligence Agency -- 
which could be used,to pay for major purchases of high technology from the 
West. The Administration proposed U.S. coal and revival of plans for 
development of nuclear electric power as substitutes for Soviet gas. AS a 
minimum precaution if they decided to go ahead with the pipeline, the U.S. 
urged the West Europeans to arrange stand-by facilities (e.g., Dutch or 
Norwegian gas). 
For much the same reasons some Members of Congress -- notably Senator Garn 
and Representatives LeBoutillier and Nelligan -- actively opposed the 
pipeline and urged the President to take a stronger position against West 
European involvement and to oppose any U.S. participation. Other Members, 
such as Representatives Gillis Long and Henry Reuss, called for a 
clarification of U.S. policy with appropriate concern for differing European 
perspectives. 
In response to the presumed Soviet role in the Polish declaration of 
martial law on Dec. 13, 1981, President Reagan banned U.S. sales to the 
Soviet Union of equipment and technical data for the refinement and 
transmission of gas and oil. This measure, which went into effect on Dec. 
30, 1981, effectively precluded U.S. companies from completing sales related 
to the pipeline. In particular, it blocked the GeneFal Electric Company from 
exporting patented rotors for the compressors the West European companies are 
to supply. After the declaration of martial law in Poland, France and West 
Germany reaffirmed their commitment to a policy of equipment supply to the 
pipeline, although that policy remained a more controversial issue in Italy. 
On June 17, President Reagan extended the ban on U.S. sales of equipment for 
the pipeline to overseas subsidiaries of U.S. firms and foreign firms that 
produce oil and gas equipment under U.S. licenses. To date, this ban has 
been defied by French, British, Italian and German companies. The U.S. has 
responded by barring the export of U.S. oil and gas related equipment and 
technology to these companies. (See Chronology for details) 
EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES 
West Europeans and Japanese generally support increased imports of natural 
gas and oil from the Soviet Union and sales of energy equipment on 
competitive credit terms for the following reasons: (1) Any increment of 
energy in the world market tends to assure reliable supply through a 
diversity of sources and holds prices down. As energy independence is not 
the option for Europe and Japan that it is perceived to be for the United 
States, energy security is seen as a product of diversity in sources of 
supply. (2) Large equipment orders are especially beneficial to stagnant 
European and Japanese metallurgy and machinery sectors and provide 
substantial job and production prospects for many years ahead. (3) Economic 
interdependence with the East may stabilize political relations and provide 
useful tools for Western diplomacy. 
Whether all the West European or Japanese official and business interests 
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agree with all the logic of the energy interdependence view, the wide 
availability of energy technology and under-utilized capacity make it likely 
that most of the equipment needed could be purchased from non-U.S. sources, 
albeit at different levels of quality and terms of sales. 
U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 
Two schools of thought are identifiable in the debate on U.S. policy 
toward the pipeline: One proposes strenuous efforts to stop Western 
equipment sales and credit to the Soviets for the pipeline; the other 
counsels acceptance of the West European commitment to the pipeline as a fait 
accompli and urges concentrating on a "safety netw to avoid vulnerability and 
on obtaining good terms of trade and credit to minimize the prospects of 
Soviet windfalls. 
The wstop-the-pipeline" school, which is led by Defense Secretary 
Weinberger in the Administration, argues that Europe may become hostage to 
the USSR or Finlandized if the pipeline deal goes through. In their view, 
the Soviets may well spend all or most of the over $10 billion in hard 
currency that the large new gas sales are expected to generate on Western 
high technology. They warn that large-scale imports of the sophisticatsd 
technologies the Soviets seek in the West would be of significant value to 
Soviet military potential. 
Taking this argument one step further, some members of the 
"stop-the-pipeline" school argue that the U.S. may be forced to devote even 
more resources to countering Soviet military power than at present. In this 
same vein, the benefits to the Sovi'et military may be even greater, if one 
believes, as many,members of this school do, that the indirect mechanisms of 
technology traxf~fer that aFCOmpany East-West commercial relations (e.g., 
training and technical docuinentation) exceed direct transfers in importance. 
Members of the "stop-the-pipelinew school have made several specific 
recommendations for U-S, policy. Although their primary goal is to prevent 
the construction of the pipeline, they seem to have a fall-back position of 
delaying the pipeline -- either as a means of delaying Soviet gains or 
perhaps in the hope that international economic and political events such as 
a fall in the price of OPEC oil will make the investment seem less attractive 
to the West Europeans. Their suggestions include the following: 
1. All-out legal and political efforts to use the leverage conferred by 
the GE patents; 
2. Forcing Poland into formal default; 
3. Renewed efforts at the head-of-state level; and 
4. An offer of U.S. coal to replace all or part of the additional 
deliveries of Soviet gas from the pipeline. 
5. Tying equipment sales,for pipeline construction to prove that "forced 
laborw is not used in the construction of the export pipeline. 
The first option became U.S. policy on June 19, when President Reagan 
extended the ban on sales of equipment for the pipeline by U.S. firms to 
their overseas subsidiaries and licensees. The new control was intended to 
prevent Alsthom-Atlantique, a French firm licensed by GE to produce rotors, 
from replacing the embargoed GE components. It is not yet clear whether the 
decision can be enforced effectively. Nor is it clear whether the pipeline 
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will be delayed significantly, since there are alternatives to the 
compressors chosen. The Administration estimates that the pipeline will be 
delayed by up to two years. In Congress, the extra territorial application 
of U.S. controls was opposed by Senators Mathias and Percy and favored by 
Senator Garn. 
The logic of the second proposal is as follows: If the U.S. Government 
declares Poland in default on any of its debts to the Export-Import Bank or 
the Commodity Credit Corporation, anxious commercial bankers would call in 
their loans. When Poland proved unable to pay them off, cross-default 
provisions, which are commonly written into loans, would throw Poland into 
default on all its loans. Since the bulk of Poland's debt is held by West 
European banks, particularly in Germany, West Europe would be greatly 
affected. Thus, the originators of this proposal reason, a Polish default or 
even a U.S. threat to force Poland into default could make West European 
bankers reluctant to finance Soviet loans for equipment. Thus far, the 
Reagan Administration has avoided any action that would force Poland into 
formal default. 
The Reagan Administration was acting on the third approach, that of 
high-level efforts to dissuade West European leaders from going ahead with 
the pipeline prior to the economic summit held in Versailles on June 6. On 
June 17, the Administration shifted to the 'la11 outw first approach. 
The Administration and some Members of Congress, notably Senator Garn and 
Representatives LeBoutillier and Nelligan, who introduced resolutions urging 
the President to develop and promote an alternative energy diversification 
project for Western Europe, were actively considering the fourth proposal .-- 
the. U.S. coal option -- during the summer and fall of 1981. Interest in 
this proposal, which may be viewed as a way of sto.pping the pipeline or as 
part of a "safety.netW if U.S. efforts fail, apparently continuek. In its 
most common variant, the U.S. would increase coal exports to West Europe and 
urge the Europeans to secure non-Soviet gas supplies (e.g., Dutch, Norwegian, 
African). Some supporters of the U.S. coal option, however, appear to view 
it as a replacement for all of the Soviet gas the Europeans plan to import. 
The "fait accompliw school argues that in spite of U.S. rhetoric and 
delays caused by the embargo of U.S. compressor parts, the pipeline will be 
built; equipment will be purchased in Europe and Japan; and credits will be 
available. Any further pressures would not only be unsuccessful, they argue, 
but.would also weaken the U.S. position on other issues and might even 
destroy the alliance. Accepting the deal as an accomplished fact, they 
believe, would permit concentration on the issues of vulnerability and 
leverage. Alternate energy sources, although expensive, could be put on line 
to avoid effective Soviet use of the gas lever. Price and credit 
negotiations could be used to the benefit of the West on other economic and- 
political issues, e.g. repatriation of Germans in the USSR. 
Individual members of the "fait accompli'l school have added criticisms of 
the proposals of the "stop-the-pipelinew school. For example, Richard L. 
Lesher and Donald Campbell, leaders of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have 
opposed any efforts to extend U.S. export controls overseas on the grounds 
that such a step would damage the U.S.'s reputation as a reliable supplier 
and might be illegal. Bankers and others have opposed the default option on 
the basis of the disruptions that the scramble for Poland's few attachable 
assets would cause in international financial markets. Most members of this 
school would not necessarily oppose U.S. adoption of the other 
option--negotiations with the West Europeans to stop the pipeline, but they 
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would argue that applying too much pressure might be injurious to long-term 
U.S. interests in the alliance and might not succeed in blocking the 
pipeline. As for the U.S. coal option, some observers have questioned how 
much more coal the U.S. could export, given current transportation and port 
facilities, and to what extent the West Europeans could substitute coal for 
gas, given their current infrastructure and the high cost of conversion. 
But, the logic of the "fait accompli" school suggests that some level of 
additional U.S. coal exports might be an element of "safety net." 
PRESENT STATUS OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PIPELINE 
Purchasing Commitments and Dependence 
For 25 years beginning in 1986, the Federal Republic of Germany and France 
will import 10.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) and 8 BCM of Soviet gas, 
respectively. While the Italian government has agreed to a "pausev to 
reconsider its commitment to the pipeline, it is considered likely to approve 
imports of 8.5 BCM annually. The Netherlands may import 2 BCM annually. 
Other countries, including Spain, are also considering importing gas from the 
pipeline. Austria has agreed to import 1.5 BCM annually for 25 years 
beginning in 1984. These commitments are over and above the Soviet gas 
already flowing into the West European gas network through the Orenbhrg and 
Northern Lights pipelines. West European interest in the new pipeline 
primarily stems from a desire to reduce dependence on oil imported from OPEC 
countries and diversify sources of natural gas. TABLE 1 shows the primary 
energy balances for the three major participants in the new gas deal at 
present and compares them with their plans for 1990. 
With the deliveries of gas from the new pipeline the share of Soviet gas- 
in the t'hree major participants' import=s.o'f gas from all sources . w i l l  rise 
considerably. TABLE 2 presents one set of estimates. 
The Safety Net 
The Federal Republic claims to have a virtually complete "safety net,I1 
i.e., alternative supplies of non-Soviet gas and other fuels, through Dutch 
"surge capacityw contracts, new gas from Norway, domestic gas, and standby 
energy sources. This has been known since early in 1981. The other European 
gas importers do not have a "safety net" as yet. As of late 1981 the 
Algerian-Italian gas line had not yet been tested, but it will provide 
additional gas in the 1980s. The Italians used the Soviet price concessions 
to hold down the Algerian price for gas to flow through the new line to 
Sicily. Liquified Nigerian gas and more Norwegian gas may be available in 
the 1990s as well as increased U.S. coal supplies. Public opposition to 
nuclear plants may limit expansion of nuclear electric power generation in 
all major West European countries except France. Premier Mitterrand seems to 
have sufficiently qualified his pre-election opposition to enable resumption 
of the ambitious French nuclear program. 
The Canadians are currently discussing the possibility of arctic gas 
projects with the French and West Germans which could provide the Europeans 
with additional natural gas reserves in the late 1980s. Potential arctic 
island gas reserves are estimated to total be 100-200 cubic trillion feet. 
Petro-Canada and TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. suggest that liquified natural 
gas could be shipped from the arctic islands to Europe in ice-breaking 
carriers. Included in the TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. group are Ruhungas AG, 
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West Germany's major natural gas transmission company and Gelsenberg AG. 
Energy Equipment (Compressor and Pipe) Sales and Financing 
Compressor sales for the 42 stations needed in the first strand of the 
pipeline--some 60% of the needed equipment--have been contracted largely with 
Creusot-Loire of France, Mannesmann of the FRG, and Nuovo Pignone of Italy. 
John Brown of Glasgow has also made some sales. All rely on GE patents for a 
crucial component of the compressors. In July 1981 a consortium of German 
banks, led by the Deutsche Bank, and the AKA Ausfuhrkredit GmbH, agreed to 
provide a four-year credit of 3.4 billion DM for the compressor stations and 
other German-made equipment. The Soviets initially agreed to make a 15% 
downpayment (equivalent to 300 million dollars) in cash. Suffering from a 
short-term shortage of hard currency, the Soviets later asked German banks to 
finance the downpayment. In December 1981 they turned down the Soviet 
request. Nominally, the interest rate is 7.8%, but in effect, it is about 
9.6%, if the above-market price the Soviets are paying for the compressors is 
taken into account. In this case, as in many others, the Soviets wanted a 
low nominal interest rate for the sake of appearances, but were willing to 
accept the higher interest rate the Germans sought if it could be disguised. 
It should be noted, however, that even the actual interest rate is favorable 
to the Soviets since it is below LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offer Rate). While 
the Soviets initially sought to link the compressor financing and pipe sales 
to deliveries of gas, the final agreement is not a barter or pay-back deal. 
After the 4-year payment period, however, the agreement may be extended to 10 
years on a pay back basis. In contrast with the German case, the full value 
of French equipment sales was financed. The first credit, extended by three 
French-banks, covered 85% of the sales value. It carried a subsidized 
interest'rate of 7.8% and was guaranteed by the Government. In February 
1981, French banks agreed to the Soviets' . request for a sec.ond credit 
equivalent to $140 million to cover what was to have been the Soviet 
downpayment. 
No sales of German.large diameter (56 inch) pipe have been finalized as of 
June 1982, although Mannesmann is expected to get the lion's share. The 
price would depend on competitive conditions. The Japanese have sold some 
pipe with government financing. A Japanese firm, Komatsu, has signed two 
contracts to supply a total of 900 pipelayers. European financing may 
involve some government guarantees, but it iS not likely to be long term. 
Nor is it yet on a barter basis. 
Gas Pricing 
Gas pricing is flexible and competitive with other fuel sources in West 
Germany through a floor price and escalation formula devised by the Soviet 
gas agency and German utility Ruhrgas. The Soviet position had been to tie 
the price of the gas directly to OPEC oil pricing on a BTU equivalent basis. 
Under the agreement, which was signed on Nov. 20, 1981, deliveries from the 
new line are to start at a modest level and climb to 40 BCM annually. The 
contract sets a minimum or floor price of $4.70 per billion BTU, and a price 
escalator formula related to heating oil and selected oil prices in Germany 
that brings the current price to $5.70. Other gas importers in France and 
Italy will receive similar prices plus transportation. As the French gas 
bTill flow through the trans-German pipeline built for an aborted Iranian gas 
apply deal (IGAT 11), no additional capital outlays will be required. 
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Gas in Soviet Energy Supplies 
In the 1 9 8 0 ~ ~  Soviet plans call for increases in all energy sources--oil, 
coal, hydro, nuclear, and gas. Oil, coal, and hydro are projected to just 
hold their relative positions. Nuclear energy is to expand rapidly but from 
a very low base. Since proven Soviet gas reserves are equivalent to Saudi 
Arabia's oil reserves and since the Soviets are encountering difficulty in 
continuing to increase oil output, natural gas is projected to account for 
the predominant share of incremental energy production in the Soviet Union. 
The key to the Soviets' ambitious plans for natural gas and for the 
maintenance of hard currency earnings is the construction of the export 
pipeline and domestic pipelines to bring the gas from Siberian fields to the 
center. This network of pipelines would exceed the rate of pipeline 
construction in any other country by several times. According to Soviet 
estimates, the pipeline construction program will cost over 25 billion 
rubles. While there seems to have been some opposition in the Politburo to 
the emphasis on natural gas, Prime Minister Brezhnev announced in November 
1981 that the pipelines would have to be completed "without fail" by the end 
of the current Five-Year-Plan, i.e. by 1985. The export line is to be 
completed and deliveries are to start by late 1984. Since the Brezhnev 
statement, there have been reports that quotas for drilling and pipelaying 
have not been met at the Urengoi field, the source of the gas for the export 
pipeline. 
Most Western observers predict that the Soviets will make every effort to 
complete the export pipeline and begin deliveries to Western Europe on 
schedule. At the July 30, 1982 hearing before the Subcommittee on 
International ~ c o n o m i c  Policy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Eaward 'A. He'yett, a senior economist at the Brookings Institution, stated in 
his testimony that "It is (therefore) unlikely the U-S. embargo will in 
itself be responsible for significant delays in the construction of the 
Soviet West-European line and the deliveries of the gas through it." A 
possible solution to the problems created by the embargo, according to Mr. 
Hewett, could be the use of the available European-made turbines in 
combination with the newly built Soviet 25 MW turbines and their older 10 MW 
turbines. The use of these smaller turbines would, however, require some 
variations in the design of the compressor stations. Meanwhile, the 
spokesmen for the Administration, Under Secretary of Commerce for 
International Trade Lionel Olmer and Under Secretary of State for Security 
Assistance, Science and Technology James Buckley did not indicate any change 
in the Administration's view, that the extra territorial application of U.S. 
controls on exports of oil and gas equipment would delay the completion of 
the pipeline by up to two years. 
The specific plans for energy production in the Soviet Eleventh Five-Year 
Plan are shown below with actual 1980 levels for comparison: 
1985 (plan) 1980 (actual) 
Oil (million metric tons) 
Gas (billion cubic meters) 
Coal (million metric tons) 
E l e c t r i c a l  generation 
(billion k w h )  
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T h e  uncertainty of o u t c o m e s  f o r  energy sources other than g a s  turns o n  
q u e s t i o n a b l e  r e s e r v e s  a n d  new technology for exploration, d e v e l o p m e n t ,  a n d  
transmission. F o r  n a t u r a l  g a s  t h e  uncertainties a r e  l a r g e l y  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
a n d  quality of pipe a n d  compressors. T h e  Western suppliers h a v e  both. 
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TABLE 1. --Primary Energy Balances: F R G ,  France, 
and Italy 
















I T A L Y  
Oil 67.1 
Solid Fuel 8.5 
Gas 15.6 
Primary electricity 8.7 
Source: Financial Times, Feb. 1, 1982, p. 2. 
TABLE 2. --Sources of Natural Gas Imports, 1980 and 1990: 
FBG, France, and Italy 






















a / By 1990, Nigerian gas may account for 3% to 4% of Italy's - 
and France's imports 
Source: Financial Times, Feb. 1, 1982, p. 2, 
Forced Labor and the Export Pipelines 
The Broomfield amendment provides for the removal of the pipeline 
sanctions within 90 days if there is presidential certification that "the 
Soviet Union is not employing or encouraging the use of forced labor in 
construction of any property affected by those sanctions." 
The Administration through Secretary of Defense Weinberger has judged the 
"human rights" issue as "compelling," but finds that "the evidence is not 
conclusiven. It appears unlikely that the Administration wou.1d find the 
evidence compelling for the opposite concPusion that forced labor was 
employed on projects related to the sanctions. The issue as stated is 
inherently difficult to prove as the terms used are imprecise and conclusive 
evidence difficult to come by. 
"Forced Laborn and Human Rights Violations. Basic elements of the Soviet 
legal system have always raised serious questions in the West. Offenses 
against the state, laws on maligning, the use of "analogy" all extend the 
parameters of Soviet law far beyond that of Western law. The application of 
law to specific cases has always been so flexible that many question whether 
there exists a rule of law or a rule of men in the U.S.S.R. Under StaPin, 
the prison camps [the Gulag Archipelgo] were filled due to the capricious 
behavior of one man. Although modified, the camp system still exists with 
many of the prisoners serving time for political, religious, and economic 
crimes which fall outside the scope of Western law. The camps, located in 
Arctic Europe and Siberia, supply workers to construction projects in those 
regions. The new gas pipeline. travels through areas.with camps. Therefore, 
is reasonable to assume that prisoners work on all pipelines. 
Foreign workers: -F'oreign workers.hav.e :participated in.the 'construcfion of 
previous pipelines, In particular these include two export pipelines that 
are now operational: the Northern Lights line, and the Orenburg line, 
running from Arctic West Siberia and the Urals, respectively. Bulgarians and 
Poles worked on the Orenburg line. 
Testimonies from Vietnamese defectors received by a German Human Rights 
organization as well as other reports cite large numbers of Vietnamese 
working on construction projects including the Urengoi-Uzhgorod export 
pipeline. However, as Secretary Weinberger noted, "the evidence is not 
conclusive.w The number of workers reported are rather large for the 
presumed tasks. The export pipeline has already been laid across the 
European Russian sectors up to the Siberian tundra. Therefore, no major tree 
clearing function seems required. Pipelaying is performed by simple 
machinery but is not labor intensive. The Soviets took over the welding and 
the compressor installation tasks from East Europeans on the Orenburg line to 
assume quality and uniformity of construction. Where Vietnamese in large 
number could make a major contribution in gas pipeline construction is not 
clear. 
Military Workers: The Soviets do use military builders on Northern 
projects. Many of the military troops are Central Asian recruits.   hey are 
considered less desirable for carrying out military operations, e.g., in 
Afghanistan; for filling out the Warsaw Pact ranks; or for serving in the 
China Watch forces. The draft is universal in the U.S.S.R. Certainly, 
Central Asians soldiers assigned to construction activities do not serve 
~ ~ l u n t a r i l y ,  but Soviet military service has generally not been regarded as 
"forced labor." 
The use of forced labor on any project affected by the sanctions as stated 
in the Broomfield Amendment is a very broad umbrella. The sanctions apply to 
all energy equipment to the U.S.S.R. This includes - all equipment related to 
exploration, development, production and transmission of coal, oil, hydro and 
nuclear power, and natural gas -- whether for domestic or export use. In 
natural gas transmission, the Urengoi-Uzhgorod export line is but one of a 
half dozen lines (five domestic and one export). (see map.) 
LEGISLATION 
H.R. 6564 (Findley et al.) 
Amends the Export Administration Act of 1979 to terminate export controls 
on goods or technology for the consideration of oil or gas pipelines or 
pipeline facilities. Introduced June 10, 1982; referred to Foreign Affairs 
Committee. 
H.R. 6838 (Findley et al.) 
Amends the Export Administration Act of 1979 to terminate certain export 
controls imposed on Dec: 30, 1981 and June 22, 1982. Introduced June 22, 
1982; referred to Foreign Affairs committee. Passed as amended on Sept. 29, 
1982. 
S. 2837 (Garn et al.) 
Unifies the export administration functions .of the U.S. Government within 
the Office of Strategic Trade, a?d improves the efficiency *and strategic 
effectiveness of exporf r.egulation while minimizing interference with. the 
ability to engage in commerce, and for other purposes. Introduced Aug. 13, 
1982; referred to Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. 
HEARINGS 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing and Ur'ban 
Affairs. Possible use of forced labor to build the Yamal Pipeline in 
the Soviet Union. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Finance 
and Monetary Policy, 97th Congress, 2d session. June 18, 1982. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982, 165 p. 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
10/05/82 -- The U.S. imposed limited sanctions against four 
West German companies - AEG-Kanis, Mannesmann 
Anlagenbau AG and two of its subsidiaries, 
Essener Hochdruck-Rohrleitungsbau and Kocks Pipeline 
Planning - after AEG-Kanis shipped two of its 47 
contracted turbines to the U.S.S.R. 
09/14/82 -- Mannesmann, a West-German firm, offered to conclude a 
deal with the Soviets for the delivery of 
large-diameter pipes through 1985. 
09/13/82 -- The Soviets reported that work on the pi leline has 
proceeded across the Volga, Don and Dnepr Rivers 
and that preparatory work has begun on the compressor 
stations that wiil utilize 25 MW turbines. 
0 9 / 1 0 / 8 2  -- The British government instructed two additional 
British companies, Walter Kidde and Andrew Antennas, 
to defy the U.S. pipeline embargo. These companies 
are subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. 
09/09/82 -- The American Embassy in Tokyo began an investigation 
to determine whether Japan Steel Works, a major 
Japanese steel company, shipped pipeline valves to 
the U.S.S.R. involving U.S.-licensed technology. 
-- Dresser Industries was denied a second request for a 
temporary restraining order to block the sanctions 
imposed against the company. However, Judge Joyce 
Green ordered the Commerce Department to hold an 
administrative hearing on the Dresser case by 
Sept. 17, 1982. Supposedly, the original sanctions 
imposed on the company have been revised to bring 
them in line with those placed on the British and 
Italian companies. 
-- The Administration imposed limited sanctions -- only 
involving U.S. exports of oil and gas related equipment 
and technology -- against the British company John 
Brown Ltd. and three of its subsidiaries after a 
Russian freighter left Glasgow for the U.S.S.R 
carrying six turbines. . .. . 
09/06/82 -- Sanctions in their revised, limited form were 
imposed on Nuovo Pignone, an Italian company, after 
two of their compressors were sent to the Soviet 
Union. 
09/03/82 -- The first 25 MW turbine was reported by the Soviets 
to have been assembled at the Nevsky Factory 
Association in Leningrad. -- Officials at Dresser Industries complained that the 
Department of Commerce was lfslow-walkingw the company 
by continuously delaying the hearing of its case. 
The company said it was ready to take its case to 
Federal court. 
-- Senior government officials from Britain, West 
Germany, Italy and France met in London to discuss the 
U.S.-European dispute over the Soviet pipeline. The 
officials are said to have drafted a set of proposals 
but did not formally release its contents. 
09/01/82 -- Donald Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, said that 
the Administration would announce its intentions to 
limit the sanctions against violators of the pipeline 
embargo to only U.S. exports of oil and gas related 
equipment and technology. 
08/31/82 -- President Reagan was advised by four senior 
Administration officials, Secretary of State Shultz, 
Secretary of Commerce Baldridge, Under Secretary of 
Commerce Olmer and Secretary of the Treasury Regan, to 
soften his sanctions against those European companies 
that violate his pipeline embargo. 
Seven European gas companies signed contracts with the 
Norweign state oil concern, Statoil, for the delivery 
of approximately 3.5 BCM a year, beginning in 1986. 
1.5 BCM a year will go to West Germany, while the 
Netherlands, Belgium and France will receive 2.0 BCM. 
Commerce Secretary Malcom Baldridge called the U.S. 
action against the French companies "a measured 
response that we hope will dissuade other firms from 
violating U.S. regulations." 
Dresser Industries1 Senior Vice President for Finance 
Edward R. Luter said that the restrictions imposed on 
Dresser by the Administration "won't affect the 
pipeline order at all." 
Dresser France appealed to the Commerce Department 
to lift the trade sanctions which barred it from 
receiving U.S. goods, services and technology. The 
company claims that "the denial of export privileges 
in this case is a violation of constitutional due 
process and of the statutory and regulatory authority 
of the department." 
The U.S. government tbok action against two French 
companies after a French freighter left Z e  Havre 
for the U.S.S.R. carrying three compressors. Dresser 
France, a U.S. subsidiary and Creusot-Loire, a 
nationalized French company, were formally banned from 
receiving any U.S. goods, services or technology under 
a temporary ndenialq' order. The Commerce Department 
simultaneously began its formal investigation to 
determine whether the restrictions should be made 
permanent. 
U.S. District Court Judge Thomas A. Flannery rejected 
Dresser's request for a temporary restraining order on 
the grounds that "the firms failed to prove that they 
would be 'irreparably damaged' by embargo sanctions 
or that they had a reasonable chance of winning 
their case in a trial." 
Dresser Industries Inc. and Dresser France requested 
a temporary restraining order in a U.S. District Court 
to block the Administration from imposing penalties if 
the compressors which had been banned by the Reagan 
June 18th sanctions were shipped to the U.S.S.R. 
Dresser Industries Inc. confirmed that it has ordered 
Dresser France to discontinue work on the pipeline 
equipment for the Soviets. 
- - The French Kinistry of Research and Industry formally 
told Dresser France, a subsidiary of Dallas-based 
Dresser Industries Inc., to fulfill its contract with 
the U.S.S.R. for 21 compressors. This order was based 
on a 1959 French law which permits the government to 
"requisition" the services of a company "when it is 
necessary to assure the needs of the country." Three 
compressors have already been completed. 
08/12/82 -- The European Common Market issued a formal protest in 
response to' President Reagan's June 18th expansion of the 
ban on sales of pipeline equipment and technology to the 
U.S.S.R. 
08/09/82 -- While AEG Telefunken, a major West German electrical 
and electronics company filed for receivership, its 
chairman, Heinz Durr announced that the company still 
plans to deliver the first two of the 47 gas turbines 
ordered by the Soviets in September. Its subsidiary 
AEG-Kanis, which builds the turbines is not affected 
by the move for receivership. 
08/06/82 -- The Wall Street Journal reported that the Japanese 
Export-Import Bank will soon begin discussions with 
the Soviets over their loan request in accordance 
with the Soviet-Japanese-Sakhalin oil and natural gas 
development project. 
08/03/82 - - '  In accordance with the provisions of the 1980 
Protection of Trading Interests Act, Lord Cock,field, 
the British 'Trade Secretary ordered four 
companies -- American Air Filter, Baker Oil Tools, 
Smith International and John Brown Engineering Ltd. 
to honor their contracts with the U.S.S.R. John 
Brown Engineering Ltd., in response 
to this announcement, said that it would 
begin delivery of the first six of the 21 ordered 
turbines by the end of August. 
08/02/82 -- Grigory Sudobin, Deputy Minister of Construction Oil and 
Gas Enterprises, commenting on the pipeline project, was 
quoted in Sovietskaya Rossiya as saying, "We are 
exactly on schedule." Furthermore, he made the point 
that U.S.-built pipelaying machines and 25 MW gas 
turbines were the only items affected by the American 
embargo, and the Soviet factories were already 
producing substitutes. 
07/27/82 -- The Belgians delayed signing an agreement to purchase 
1-3 BCM of gas per year (1985-1995) from the Soviets. 
07/26/82 -- The Soviets reported that they are presently holding talks 
with Greeks concerning the construction of a major gas 
pipeline which will run from the USSR to Greece through 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
07/24/82 -- The Italian Foreign Ministry publicly stated that 
Italian contracts concluded with the Soviet Union for 
the sale of pipeline equipment "will be honoredw. 
07/22/82 -- Italian Foreign Minister Colombo expressed his 
objection to the President's June 18th decision at a 
meeting with Secretary of State Shultz. He described 
U.S. policies as "fragmented". 
-- The French Government officially ordered those 
companies involved in the Soviet pipeline deal to 
honor their contracts despite President Reagan's June 
18th decision. The Government said that the contracts 
"must be honoredw and that "deliveries due in 1982 
must be made according to schedule." 
07/19/82 -- The U.S. Ambassador to France, Evan Galbrith, warned 
the French Company, Astrom Atlantique that ignoring 
the U.S. embargo of American licensed technology could 
result in harsh penalties. 
07/14/82 -- French President Mitterand expressed his objections 
to the U.S. trying to gain West European support for 
its economic actions taken against the U.S.S.R. 
07/13/82 -- The West German Bank Consortium, led by Deutshe Bank, 
and the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank concluded an 
agreement whereby the West Germans would extend the 
Soviets $1.13 billion (2.8 billion Deutsche marks) in 
credit to purchase West German pipeline equipment. 
This agreement does not pertain to the financing of 
West German .pipe. These loans, which cover the cost 
of 85% of,West German'orders, are'guaranteed by the 
West German ~overnmen; through the Hermes Credit 
Insurance Company at market rates for an 8 year period 
at the interest rate of 7.8%. The Soviets have the 
option of obtaining additional credit which would raise 
the total amount of West German credit to $1.6 billion. 
07/09/82 -- Vladimir Filanovskiy, a high-ranking representative 
of the State Planning Committee said today that the 
Soviets have begun manufacturing their own 25 MW 
gas turbines in Leningrad. These, he said, will be 
used in the Soviet-Western Europe pipeline. His 
statement confirmed earlier unofficial reports on 
this subject. 
-- Addressing the pipeline issue at a press conference, 
West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said "We will 
stick to the agreements our firms made with the Soviet 
Union and so will France and Britain." 
07/07/82 -- The Japanese announced that despite the recent U.S. 
sanctions they will proceed with the Sakhalin oil 
and natural gas project. However, because of the U.S. 
actions, the project would be delayed at least a year. 
07/06/82 -- Soviet gas officials were to meet with the Western companies 
participating in the Soviet-Western Europe pipeline 
project in order to discuss the project in light of 
President Reagan's June 18th decision. 
05/24/82 -- The Austrians concluCed an agreement with the Soviet Union 
to purchase 1.5 BCM of gas for the next 25 years. 
The Austrians, furthermore, have until October to decide 
whether to buy an additional BCM of gas each year. 
06/22/82 -- The European Common Market foreign ministers said that 
the extended ban on oil and gas equipment imposed by 
President Reagan on June 18, 1982 was in violation of 
international law. 
06/21/82 -- Klaus BoPling, speaking for the West German 
Government, expressed dissatisfaction with 
President Reagan's decision to extend the U.S. 
embargo of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet 
Union. 
06/18/82 -- President Reagan extended the embargo on U.S. sales 
of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union to 
overseas subsidiaries and licensees of U.S. firms. 
06/15/82 -- Soviet Minister of Gas, Vassily A. Binkov called a meeting 
of the major European companies involved in the 
Soviet Western Europe pipeline project for June 18 in 
Lausanne, Switzerland in order to discuss the 
existing contracts and to alert the Europeans that 
failure to meet tlleir commitments could result in harsh 
penalties. 
Q .  
06/07/82 -- Officials of the German gas company, Ruhrgas A.G., 
announced that the Soviets had assured them that 
deliveries via the pipeline would begin in late 
1984, as scheduled, despite the Reagan Administration's 
ban on exports of oil and gas equipment by U.S. firms. 
02/18/82 -- The Executive Council of the AFL-CIO called for an 
embargo of all trade with the Soviet Union and a 
declaration of Polish default. 
02/17/82 -- The U.S. Chamber of Commerce made public its opposition to 
plans emerging within the Administration to halt the 
pipeline by releasing a copy of a letter written to the 
President on February 5 by its head, Richard L. Lesher. 
02/10/82 -- A group of French banks announced an agreement to provide 
an additional credit of $140 million to finance Soviet 
purchases of equipment for the pipeline from French 
companies. The loan, which was at the market rate and 
was not guaranteed by the Government, followed an earlier 
credit from French banks for 85% of French sales and 
covered the 15% downpayment the Soviets had initially 
agreed to make. 
02/02/82 -- The Japanese Export-Import Bank announced that 
Komatsu would be allowed to complete its sale of 
pipe-laying equipment to the Soviet Union. The 
machines were similar to the embargoed Caterpillar 
pipelayers. 
01/29/82 -- Italy's state energy agency (Ente h'azionale 
Idrocarburi - ENI) confirmed that it had reached 
a "technical agreement" on the price and quantity of 
Soviet gas to be delivered. E N 1  officials stated that 
the agreement did not change the government's decision 
to "pause for reflectionw on whether to go ahead with 
the pipeline deal. 
01/26/82 -- A majority of the members of the European Community 
agreed in principle to seek an increase in 
minimum interest rates charged for credits to the 
Soviet Union. Raising interest rates would require 
agreement in the OECD. 
01/23/82 -- Gaz de France signed an agreement to purchase about 
280 BCM (billion cubic meters) of Soviet gas from 
the pipeline annually for the 25 years beginning in 
1986. 
01/14/82 -- The German Parliament rejected a resolution, introduced 
by the Christian Democratic Party, calling for 
economic, political, and financial sanctions against 
Poland and the Soviet Union unless the former revived 
the reforms of 1980-81. 
01/13/82 -- The Federal Republic's Economic Minister, Otto 
Lambsdorff, told the Cabinet that the Government's 
pledge not.to undermine the U.S. sanctions applied 
. orily to new contracts and only ts contracts for which 
a U.S. firm was the prime contractor. This 
clarification would appear to exclude the German 
compressor contract for which General Electric is 
a subcontractor. 
01/08/82 -- The General Electric Company announced that its 
application for a license to export $175 million 
dollarsv worth of rotors and other components for 
compressor stations had been denied. The company 
was a sub-contractor for John Brown Engineering, 
Ltd. (UK), Nuovo Pignone (Italy) and AEG-Telefunken 
(FRG), which had agreed to supply 47 compressor 
stations. 
12/29/81 -- Declaring that the Soviet Union bore a "heavy 
and direct responsibility" for the imposition of 
martial law in Poland, President Reagan announced a 
series of sanctions, including suspension of licensing 
of oil and gas equipment and other high-technology items. 
12/10/81 -- Senator Charles Percy (R-Illinois) announced that 
the Caterpillar Tractor Company had received a 
license to export 200 pipelayers worth $80 million 
to the Soviet Union. The license was subject to the 
end-use requirement that the pipelayers not be 
used in the construction of the Soviet-West 
European pipeline. 
-- French officials announced the approval of a 
sale of electronic systems for controiling the 
flow of gas in the pipeline by Thomas-CSF. The 
announcement followed a six-month intra-governmental 
debate and a modification of the order to prevent 
the Soviets from obtaining certain computer 
technologies. The government also announced that 
it would not refer the sale to CoCom since it 
was not strategic. 
1P/20/81 -- The Soviet Union and Ruhrgas A.G. (FRG) signed an 
agreement on the price and quantity of natural gas 
to be delivered by the pipeline. The guaranteed 
minimum price was reported as $5.70. Deliveries 
are to start in 1986; to reach 10.5 BCM by 1987; 
and to remain at that level until 2006. 
11/17/81 -- Congressman Gillis Long (D-La.) inserted in the 
Congressional Record answers to questions on 
U.S. policy toward the pipeline from the 
Secretaries of State, Commerce, Treasury, and 
Energy. 
10/17/81 -- Senator Garn introduced a resolution expressing 
the sense of Congress that the President should: 
(1) prohibit any U.S. involvement in the pipeline; 
(2) urge the West European countries and Japan 
n.ot to participate in the pipeline; (3) propose and 
enlist West European countries and Japan in a 
project to &iversify energy sources;' (4) promote such 
a project; and (5) establish a U.S. policy with 
respect to the promotion of Soviet energy 
resources development. 
09/00/8!. -- Nuovo Pignone of Italy agreed to supply 19 compressor 
stations for the pipeline. 
-- The Soviet equipment trading agency (Machinoimport) 
signed an agreement with Mannesmann (FKG) and 
Creusot-Loire (France) to supply 22 compressor 
stations for the pipeline. 
07/29/81 -- Senator Charles Percy (R-Illinois) announced the 
Administration's approval of the Caterpillar Tractor 
Company's application to export 100 pipelayers to the 
Soviet Union. 
07/21/81 -- Representative John LeBoutillier (R-NY) introduced a 
concurrent resolution stating that it was the sense 
of Congress that the President should (1) prohibit U.S. 
participation in the pipeline; (2) urge the Western 
European countries and Japan not to participate; (3) 
enlist their cooperation in an alternative energy 
diversification project and (4) promote such a project. 
07/19/ i - 07/21/81 -- At the Ottawa Economic Summit President 
Reagan tried, but failed, to persuade the West European 
leaders to abandon their plans for the pipeline. 
07/14/81 -- Congressman Gillis Long (D-La.) published responses 
from the Secretaries of Energy, Commerce, Treasury 
and State to questions on the financing and 
construction of the pipeline in the Congressional 
Record. 
07/00/81 -- A consortium of German banks, led by Deutsche Bank, 
and the AKA Ausfuhrkredit GmnH agreed to provide some 
3.4 billion DM in credits for the compressor stations. 
As part of this complex arrangement, the Soviets 
agreed to make a 600 million DM downpayment, bringing 
the total to 4 billion DM (U.S., $2 billion). 
06/24/81 -- Between 40 and 50 Members of Congress, led by 
Senator Garn, sent a letter to President Reagan, 
expressing concern that the pipeline would endanger 
Western security and suggesting alternatives to West 
European participation in the pipeline. 
11/14/80 -- The Caterpillar Tractor Company was authorized to 
negotiate the sale of pipe-laying and earth-moving 
equipment to the U.S.S.R. Initially, the Soviets told 
the company's negotiators that they were interested in 
buying 200 pipe-layers for use on the export pipeline. 
The Soviets subsequently halved the order and told 
the company that the equipment would not be used 
on the export pipeline since the financing arrangements 
for it had not been completed. 
I. . 
00/00/78 -- The Soviets proposed the construction of 'a natural gas 
pipeline from the Yamburg field to Western Europe. Plans 
to develop this field were later pushed back and the 
Soviets decided to start the pipeline at the 
Urengoi field, which was already in production. 
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